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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902: AFTER 75 YEARS
160 ACRE LIMITATION HELD VALID
RECLAMATION LAW-RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902-One
hundred-sixty acre limitation on land under single ownership in
irrigation districts receiving federal reclamation project water
held valid and enforceable after 75 years of administrative and
judicial neglect. United States v. Imperial Irrigation District, 559
F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
"I didn't know what I was getting into. . . I've spent $35,000,
but the bastards have spent a million. And I've driven them
nuts. "I
These words were spoken by Dr. Ben L. Yellen while awaiting the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Imperial Irrigation District and its companion case, Yellen v. Andrus.2
The suit was initiated in 1967 when the U.S. Department of the
Interior filed for declaratory judgment against the Imperial Irriga-
tion District 3 in southern California to enforce compliance with the
excess lands provision of §46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of
19264 (hereinafter referred to as §46). Section 46 puts a 160 acre
limitation on the amount of irrigable land an individual may own
within an irrgiation district that received Bureau of Reclamation
project water.5
1. Mankin, The Man Who Stands Up to Agribusiness, MOTHER JONES, Feb./March 1977,
at 35.
2. Yellen v. Andrus, 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 322 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.Cal. 1971).
4. 43 U.S.C. §423e (1970). The Act requires execution of contracts between irrigation
districts and the United States for repayment of costs incurred in the construction and
maintenance of reclamation projects.
5. Section 46 provides, in part, that
No water shall be delivered upon completion of any new project . . . initiated
after May 25, 1925, until contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary
of the Interior have been made with an irrigation district. . . . Such contract or
contracts . . . shall further provide that all irrigable land held in private
ownership by any one owner in excess of one hundred and sixty acres shall be
appraised . . . on the basis of its actual bona fide value at the date of appraisal
without reference to the proposed construction of the irrigation works; and that
no such excess lands so held shall receive any water from any project or division if
the owners thereof shall refuse to execute valid recordable contracts for the sale of
such lands. ...
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In 1969 Ben Yellen and 122 other non-landowner residents of the
Imperial Valley filed the Yellen suit against the Secretary of the
Interior 6 to enforce the residency requirement of §5 of the Reclama-
tion Act of 1902. 7 This section requires that a landowner receiving
federal reclamation project water must be a resident of the land
benefitted or reside "in the neighborhood of said land . . ." Yellen
had originally sought to intervene in the Department of the Interior's
suit against the Imperial Irrigation District 8 (hereinafter referred to as
the District); but the application was denied. The Yellen suit was
then filed.9 The government lost in both cases and decided not to
appeal the U.S. District Court's decision in Imperial Irrigation'o but
proceeded with the appeal from Yellen." Meanwhile, the plaintiffs in
Yellen sought to intervene and prosecute the appeal in the govern-
ment's suit against the District, which application was allowed. 12
Both cases were consolidated on appeal.
The major issues before the Court of Appeals were: 13 a) whether
plaintiffs had standing to sue in Yellen or to intervene and carry
forward the appeal in Imperial Irrigation; b) whether the action in
Imperial Irrigation was barred by a 1933 California state court
decision, Hewes v. All Persons; c) whether the Boulder Canyon
Project Act (hereinafter referred to as the Project Act)' 4 which
authorized numerous water projects in the Colorado River watershed
applied the acreage limitations of §46 to private lands within the
District; d) whether, if the §46 limitations did apply within the
District, the court could rely on an unbroken history of non-enforce-
ment by the Department of the Interior to deny plaintiffs relief.
To resolve the standing issues in Yellen the court applied a test it
had recently enunciated in Bowker v. Morton.15 Plaintiffs in Yellen
6. Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Cal. 1971). (Summary judgment was granted for
the plaintiffs.) Thereafter, various landowners in the Imperial Valley intervened and a full trial
on the merits was held. Yellen v. Hickel, 353 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Cal. 1972). (Judgment was
entered for the plaintiffs.) Both the landowners and the government appealed. On appeal, the
name of Cecil D. Andrus, as Secretary of the Interior, was substituted for that of Walter J.
Hickel, his predecessor in office.
7. 43 U.S.C. §431 (1970).
8. Supra note 3.
9. Supra note 6.
10. Supra note 3.
11. Supra note 6.
12. __ F.2d 1941, (9th Cir. August 6, 1973).
13. United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., - F.2d (9th Cir. 1977).
14. 43 U.S.C. §§617 et seq. (1970).
15. Supra note 13, at 1910. The test requires that "'... plaintiffs must have alleged (a) a
particularized injury (b) demonstrably resulting from defendants' action (c) which injury will be
redressed by the remedy sought." Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1976), as
quoted in United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., supra note 13.
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had alleged a desire to purchase farm land within the District,
claiming that enforcement of §5 of the Reclamation Act of 190216
would cause land prices in the District to drop to a level that they
could afford to pay.17 However, focusing on the absence of evidence
as to what any plaintiff could afford to pay for a particular piece of
land, or a showing that if prices dropped as a result of the court's
action they would fall to a level that plaintiffs could afford, the court
concluded that a "mere speculative possibility that any relief which is
appropriate under the statute will bring about the result sought by
plaintiffs . . ." was insufficient to support plaintiff's standing under
Bowker. 18 Consequently standing was denied.
In Imperial Irrigation, the Yellen plaintiffs' application for inter-
vention and appeal was granted on the grounds that it was necessary
for the appellate court to resolve the potential conflict between the
district court's decisions in Yellen and Imperial Irrigation.19 But in
view of its decision regarding plaintiffs' standing in Yellen, the basis
for the order allowing this intervention had disappeared and the court
was constrained to re-examine the question. 10 Using again the
standing test from Bowker the court found that the injury alleged
here-prices for land which must be paid by plaintiffs are higher than
if §46 were enforced within the District-was a direct result of
non-enforcement of §46. Therefore, the relief that could be ordered
(enforcement of §46) would redress this injury. 2' Plaintiffs were also
found within the "zone of interests" nonconstitutional standing test
from Data Processing Service v. Camp. 22
The final hurdle leapt by the court prior to its consideration of the
merits of the action involved the assertion by the landowners that the
California state court's holding in Hewes v. All Persons acted as a bar
by way of res judicata to the application of the §46 acreage limits
within the District. Hewes was a confirmation proceeding to validate
a contract between the United States and the District concerning the
District's repayment of the construction costs of the All-American
Canal, which carries federal reclamation project water from Hoover
Dam in Arizona to the Imperial Valley in central and southern
California. Borrowing language from Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. All
Persons the court stated that " 'Within its pertinent issues .. .[the
16. Specifically plaintiffs desired enforcement of the residency requirements of §5 of the
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. 431 (1970).
17. Supra note 13, at 1911.
18. Id. at 1913.
19. Supra note 3.
20. Supra note 13, at 1915.
21. Id. at 1917.
22. Id. at 1918.
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confirmation proceedings] will be binding on the world at large.' "23
However, the court went on to find that, since the validity of the
Hewes contract did not depend on whether the acreage limits of the
reclamation law were applicable, the comments in Hewes concerning
those limits were dicta,24 and thus did not foreclose consideration of
those limits in the instant case.2 5 The procedural obstacles thus
eliminated, the court was finally able to deal with the merits of the
case.
The defendant landowners' contention was that either the Project
Act itself or its legislative history refute plaintiffs' allegation that the
acreage limitations in §46 were applicable within the District.
Section 12 of the Project Act defines reclamation law as the
Reclamation Act of 1902, "and the Acts amendatory thereof and
supplemental thereto." 26 Section 46 is within this definition. 27 Sec-
tions 128 and 4(b)29 of the Project Act require reimbursement of
expenditures made by the United States for construction, mainte-
nance, and operation of the All-American Canal and require that such
reimbursement be secured "by contract or otherwise . . . in the
manner provided in the reclamation law." 30 Section 14 states that the
"reclamation law shall govern the construction, operation and
maintenance of the works herein authorized, except as otherwise
provided." 31 Thus the court found that "[b]y direct scrutiny of the
statutory language, it is apparent that the acreage limitations of
Section 46 apply to private land in the [District] that receive
irrigation water from the All-American Canal." 32
Justice Wollenberg, quoting the United States Supreme Court,
stated that although Congress had occasionally exempted projects
from the excess land provisions of the reclamation laws, "the Congress
has always made such exemption by express enactment." 33 The
landowners contended that enforcement of §46 would impair their
present perfected water rights within the District,34 rights that must
be protected under the Project Act. 35 While agreeing with this, the
23. Id. at 1920.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1921.
26. 43 U.S.C. §617k (1970).
27. Supra note 13, at 1921.
28. 43 U.S.C. §617 (1970).
29. 43 U.S.C. §617c(b) (1970).
30. Id.
31. 43 U.S.C. §617m (1970).
32. Supra note 13, at 1922.
33. Id.
34. Supra note 13, at 1923.
35. Section 6 of the Project Act, supra note 14, 43 U.S.C. §617e; Arizona v. California, 376
U.S. 330 (1964).
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court held that the landowners within an irrigation district do not
own water rights but rather acquire a right to use the water owned by
the district because of their status as "member[s] of the class for
whose benefit the water has been appropriated."36 Therefore the
acreage limits of §46, which apply only to individual landowners,
cannot impair any present perfected water rights of the District itself.
The court also dispensed with some alleged inconsistencies within
the Project Act that the landowners claimed would result if §46
applied as plaintiffs contended.3 7 The court presented an extended
discussion of the legislative history of the Project Act,38 which "...
does not lead us to conclude that Congress intended to exempt lands
receiving water carried by the All-American Canal from the acreage
limitations of §46. On the contrary . . . the problem did not receive
the extended Congressional consideration that would be normally
thought appropriate if an exemption to an important part of the
reclamation law was being created."3 9
The last major argument advanced by the defendant landowners
was that the practice of non-enforcement by the Department of the
Interior, starting before the All-American Canal was completed,
should be given great weight in the construction of the Project Act.
The court responded by pointing out that the policy of non-
enforcement began because of a letter from then Secretary of the
Interior, Lyman Wilbur, to the District dated February 24, 1933.40
This letter was not a formal ruling by the Department, 41 dealt with a
different section of the reclamation law,42 did not speak to the
purported inconsistencies between §46 and sections of the Project
Act,43 has been generally criticized from within, and ultimately
rejected by the Department. 44 Justice Wollenberg agreed that
administrative interpretation, in cases such as this, is entitled to great
36. Supra note 13, at 1924.
37. Id. at 1926-28.
38. Id. at 1928-33.
39. Id. at 1931.
40. Id. at 1933.
41. Id. at 1935.
42. Id. at 1933.
43. Id, at 1934.
44. The Wilbur letter was criticized in 1945 by Solicitor Fowler Harper as being "... an
informal decision designed to help the [District] in the litigation then pending [Hewes and
Malan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., a companion case to Hewes] . .", supra note 14, at 1935.
Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug stated in 1948 that "... the legal validity of the
conclusions in the Wilbur letter might be questionable." Id. In 1958 Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior Elmer F. Bennett came to the same conclusions reached by Secretary Krug in
1948, and stated in a footnote that the acreage limitations did apply within the Imperial Valley,
id. at 1936. Solicitor Frank J. Barry specifically rejected Wilbur's conclusions in 1964, on behalf
of the Department, id.
October 1977]
NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
weight. However, he said, "The ultimate responsibility for interpret-
ing the language of Congress resides in the courts, adding that an
"administrative practice plainly contrary to the law may be over-
turned no matter how long-standing." 46
The court concluded by reversing the district court's denial of
leave to intervene in Imperial Irrigation, validated the notice of
appeal, and reversed the lower court's determination on the merits. In
the Yellen case the lower court's judgment was vacated and the case
remanded with instruction to dismiss for lack of standing.
CONCLUSION
In a long, complex, but remarkably well-written opinion, the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals has managed to upset the foundations of one
of the richest farming communities in the United States. Ben Yellen is
probably quite pleased; the large landowners in the Imperial Valley
most assuredly are not. There is little doubt that this case will be
taken before the Supreme Court, where enforcement of the 160 acre
limit after three-quarters of a century of judicial and administrative
inaction will send an economic, social, and political shock wave
through the heart of the United States. As it now stands, the court's
decision represents a victory for, and a step towards, preservation of
the family farm, Thomas Jefferson's "seedbed of civic virtue."
CHRISTOPHER LACKMANN
45. Supra note 13, at 1936.
46. Id. at at 1937.
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